Раздел: Документация

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Objectives

EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.

Assurance components

EAL2 (see Table 6.3) provides assurance by an analysis of the security functions, using a functional and interface specification, guidance documentation and the high-level design of the TOE, to understand the security behaviour.

The analysis is supported by independent testing of the TOE security functions, evidence of developer testing based on the functional specification, selective independent confirmation of the developer test results, strength of function analysis, and evidence of a developer search for obvious vulnerabilities (e.g. those in the public domain).

EAL2 also provides assurance through a configuration list for the TOE, and evidence of secure delivery procedures.

This EAL represents a meaningful increase in assurance from EAL1 by requiring developer testing, a vulnerability analysis, and independent testing based upon more detailed TOE specifications.

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Assurance class	Assurance components
Configuration management	ACMCAP.2 Configuration items
Delivery and operation	ADO DEL.l Delivery procedures
	ADOIGS.l Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
Development	ADV FSP.1 Informal functional specification
	ADVHLD.l Descriptive high-level design
	ADV RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration
Guidance documents	AGDADM.1 Administrator guidance
	AGDUSR.1 User guidance
Tests	ATECOV.l Evidence of coverage
	ATEFUN.l Functional testing
	ATEIND.2 Independent testing - sample
Vulnerability assessment	AVASOF.l Strength of TOE security function evaluation
	AVA VLA.l Developer vulnerability analysis

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Objectives

EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practices.

EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.

Assurance components

EAL3 (see Table 6.4) provides assurance by an analysis of the security functions, using a functional and interface specification, guidance documentation, and the high-level design of the TOE, to understand the security behaviour.

The analysis is supported by independent testing of the TOE security functions, evidence of developer testing based on the functional specification and high-level design, selective independent confirmation of the developer test results, strength of function analysis, and evidence of a developer search for obvious vulnerabilities (e.g. those in the public domain).

EAL3 also provides assurance through the use of development environment controls, TOE configuration management, and evidence of secure delivery procedures.

This EAL represents a meaningful increase in assurance from EAL2 by requiring more complete testing coverage of the security functions and mechanisms and/or procedures that provide some confidence that the TOE will not be tampered with during development.

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