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whereas narrative summaries for the ASE families can be found in ISO/IEC 15408-1, Annex C, subclauses C.2.2 through C.2.8.

2.4 Usage of terms in ISO/IEC 15408-3

The following is a list of terms which are used in a precise way in this part of ISO/IEC 15408. They do not merit inclusion in the glossary because they are general English terms and their usage, though restricted to the explanations given below, is in conformance with dictionary definitions. However, those explanations of the terms were used as guidance in the development of this part of ISO/IEC 15408 and should be helpful for general understanding.

Check - This term is similar to, but less rigourous than "confirm" or "verify". This term requires a quick determination to be made by the evaluator, perhaps requiring only a cursory analysis, or perhaps no analysis at all.

Coherent - An entity is logically ordered and has a discernible meaning. For documentation, this addresses both the actual text and the structure of the document, in terms of whether it is understandable by its target audience.

Complete - All necessary parts of an entity have been provided. In terms of documentation, this means that all relevant information is covered in the documentation, at such a level of detail that no further explanation is required at that level of abstraction.

Confirm - This term is used to indicate that something needs to be reviewed in detail, and that an independent determination of sufficiency needs to be made. The level of rigour required depends on the nature of the subject matter. This term is only applied to evaluator actions.

Consistent - This term describes a relationship between two or more entities, indicating that there are no apparent contradictions between these entities.

Counter (verb) - This term is typically used in the context that a security objective counters a particular threat, but does not necessarily indicate that the threat is completely eradicated as a result.

Demonstrate - This term refers to an analysis leading to a conclusion, which is less rigourous than a "proof".

Describe - This term requires that certain, specific details of an entity be provided.

Determine - This term requires an independent analysis to be made, with the objective of reaching a particular conclusion. The usage of this term differs from "confirm" or "verify", since these other terms imply that an analysis has already been performed which needs to be reviewed, whereas the usage of "determine" implies a truly independent analysis, usually in the absence of any previous analysis having been performed.

Ensure - This term, used by itself, implies a strong causal relationship between an action and its consequences. This term is typically preceded by the word "helps", which indicates that the consequence is not fully certain, on the basis of that action alone.


Exhaustive - This term is used in the standard with respect to conducting an analysis or other activity. It is related to "systematic" but is considerably stronger, in that it indicates not only that a methodical approach has been taken to perform the analysis or activity according to an unambiguous plan, but that the plan that was followed is sufficient to ensure that all possible avenues have been exercised.

Explain - This term differs from both "describe" and "demonstrate". It is intended to answer the question "Why?" without actually attempting to argue that the course of action that was taken was necessarily optimal.

Internally consistent - There are no apparent contradictions between any aspects of an entity. In terms of documentation, this means that there can be no statements within the documentation that can be taken to contradict each other.

Justification - This term refers to an analysis leading to a conclusion, but is more rigorous than a demonstration. This term requires significant rigour in terms of very carefully and thoroughly explaining every step of a logical argument.

Mutually supportive - This term describes a relationship between a group of entities, indicating that the entities possess properties which do not conflict with, and may assist the other entities in performing their tasks. It is not necessary to determine that every individual entity in question directly supports other entities in that grouping; rather, it is a more general determination that is made.

Prove - This refers to a formal analysis in its mathematical sense. It is completely rigourous in all ways. Typically, "prove" is used when there is a desire to show correspondence between two TSF representations at a high level of rigour.

Specify - This term is used in the same context as "describe", but is intended to be more rigourous and precise. It is very similar to "define".

Trace (verb) - This term is used to indicate that an informal correspondence is required between two entities with only a minimal level of rigour.

Verify - This term is similar in context to "confirm", but has more rigourous connotations. This term when used in the context of evaluator actions indicates that an independent effort is required of the evaluator.

2.5Assurance categorisation

The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table 2.1.

2.6Assurance class and family overview

The following summarises the assurance classes and families of clauses 8-14. These classes and family summaries are presented in the same order as they appear in clauses 8-14.


Assurance Class

Assurance Family

Abbreviated Name

Class ACM: Configuration management

CM automation

ACMAUT

CM capabilities

ACMCAP

CM scope

ACMSCP

Class ADO: Delivery

and operation

Delivery

ADODEL

Installation, generation and start-up

ADOIGS

Class ADV: Development

Functional specification

ADVFSP

High-level design

ADVHLD

Implementation representation

ADVIMP

TSF internals

ADVINT

Low-level design

ADVLLD

Representation correspondence

ADVRCR

Security policy modeling

ADVSPM

Class AGD: Guidance documents

Administrator guidance

AGDADM

User guidance

AGDUSR

Class ALC: Life cycle support

Development security

ALCDVS

Flaw remediation

ALCFLR

Life cycle definition

ALCLCD

Tools and techniques

ALCTAT

Class ATE: Tests

Coverage

ATECOV

Depth

ATEDPT

Functional tests

ATEFUN

Independent testing

ATEIND

Class AVA:

Vulnerability assessment

Covert channel analysis

AVACCA

Misuse

AVAMSU

Strength of TOE security functions

AVASOF

Vulnerability analysis

AVAVLA

2.6.1 Class ACM: Configuration management

Configuration management (CM) helps to ensure that the integrity of the TOE is preserved, by requiring discipline and control in the processes of refinement and modification of the TOE and other related information. CM prevents unauthorised modifications, additions, or deletions to the TOE, thus providing assurance that the TOE and documentation used for evaluation are the ones prepared for distribution.

2.6.1.1 CM automation (ACM AUT)

Configuration management automation establishes the level of automation used to control the configuration items.



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